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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a spouse, shortly after his wife’s death, learning from 
the trustee of his wife’s revocable trust that the home in which she 
lived for twenty years, and in which the couple lived for fifteen 
years after their marriage, was not considered by the trustee to be 
the deceased wife’s homestead and that he needs to move out.  
Although the husband is speechless, the trustee calmly explains 
that, prior to marriage, the wife transferred her house into a 
revocable trust, which leaves the home to her children from a 
previous marriage.  The trustee continues that, because the trustee 
owned the house at the wife’s death, the home is not considered 
the wife’s homestead under the descent statute.  Further, the 
trustee says the fact that the wife was a resident of a nursing home 
for the last year of her life means that she also did not occupy the 
home, another necessary requirement for defining a homestead.  
The outraged husband seeks out an attorney to litigate the issue of 
whether he is entitled to remain in the home that he and his wife 
shared during their marriage. 
Imagine next a younger couple who marry after living in and 
owning their own homes.  The couple resides in the wife’s house 
while they completely remodel the husband’s home.  The husband 
dies unexpectedly in a car accident, but the couple had not yet 
taken up residence in the husband’s home, and the husband had 
not changed his will that left everything to his parents and siblings, 
the husband had not transferred his home into joint tenancy with 
his wife.  The personal representative of the husband’s estate 
informs the wife that she is not entitled to the home she and her 
late husband had spent countless hours remodeling, and where 
they intended to live, because the house was uninhabitable and 
therefore not capable of being occupied by the husband as his 
homestead.  In any event, the personal representative says, the 
husband could only have one homestead so it must be the wife’s 
house where he was living at death. 
Most married couples acquire and own their homes in the 
traditional manner.  They buy it together during the marriage and 
own it in joint tenancy.  However, with the increasing frequency of 
second marriages, marriages that occur later in life and after 
significant wealth accumulation, the possibility of these 
hypothetical scenarios actually coming into the legal practitioner’s 
door is not as remote as it may seem.  Further, these cases present 
practitioners with a more complicated issue than it may seem at 
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first blush because of the lack of a clear and specific definition of 
the term “homestead,” as it is used in the descent of homestead 
statute.  The difficulty is not in defining the term homestead, as it is 
well settled that it is a dwelling owned and occupied by the 
decedent at his or her death.1  Rather, the difficulty is in 
ascertaining, with a sufficient degree of certainty to avoid 
protracted and expensive litigation, what it means to “own or 
occupy” a dwelling for purposes of creating a homestead.  Prior to 
analyzing the issues that may arise in the litigation of ownership 
and occupation, it is necessary to examine what existing law holds 
with respect to the descent of the homestead. 
II. THE DESCENT OF THE HOMESTEAD 
A.  Minn. Stat. § 524.2-402 
In Minnesota, the homestead descends to the surviving spouse, 
regardless of any testamentary or other disposition, if there are no 
surviving descendants of the decedent.2  If there are surviving 
descendants of the decedent, then the homestead descends to the 
surviving spouse for life and the remainder in equal shares to the 
decedent’s descendants by representation.3  Specifically, the 
relevant portions of the descent of homestead statute provide as 
follows: 
(a) If there is a surviving spouse, the homestead, 
including a manufactured home which is the 
family residence, descends free from any 
 
 1. See infra notes 20-47 and accompanying text. 
 2. See MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402 (2000). A comment should be made about 
when a person is a decedent’s surviving spouse.  Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-
802 provides that when a marriage to a decedent has been dissolved or annulled 
then the person is not a surviving spouse.  However, this same statute provides that 
“[a] decree of separation which does not terminate the status of husband and wife 
is not a dissolution of marriage for purposes of this section.”  Based upon this 
provision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a decedent’s estranged wife 
was his “surviving spouse” and, therefore, was entitled to her elective share even 
though (1) the estranged wife and decedent were separated, (2) the decedent had 
led the wife to believe that they were divorced when, in fact, they had not been 
divorced, and (3) the wife had remarried even though she had not been divorced.  
See In re Estate of Kueber, 390 N.W.2d 22, 23-24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).  The court 
further denied the personal representative’s argument that equitable principles 
should preclude decedent’s estranged wife from taking her elective share.  Id. at 
24. 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402(a)(2). 
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testamentary or other disposition of it to which 
the spouse has not consented in writing or as 
provided by law, as follows: 
1) if there is no surviving descendant of 
decedent, to the spouse; or 
2) if there are surviving descendants of 
decedent, then to the spouse for the term of 
the spouse’s natural life and the remainder 
in equal shares to the decedent’s 
descendants by representation. 
(b) If there is no surviving spouse and the 
homestead has not been disposed of by will it 
descends as other real estate. . . .4 
Minnesota’s descent of homestead statute does not provide a 
definition of the word “homestead;” however the following 
discussion will address what courts have interpreted to be the 
meaning of homestead under the homestead descent statute.5 
B.  Dower and Homestead Rights Historically 
Legal protection for the rights of a surviving spouse and 
children arise out of a surviving spouse’s right to a dower or curtesy 
interest in the deceased spouse’s lands, to which homestead rights 
closely resemble.6  Dower and curtesy rights in Minnesota vested in 
fee, to the surviving spouse, a one-third interest in all real property 
owned by the deceased spouse at his death, with the residue being 
vested in equal shares to the decedent’s children.7  These rights 
were in addition to the right of a surviving spouse to the homestead 
or to a life estate in the homestead.8  Dower and curtesy rights have 
been abolished in Minnesota,9 but the right to an interest in  
homestead continues.  This right was first statutorily created in 
1876.10  In 1878, the statute was amended to read: 
The surviving spouse or husband shall also be entitled to 
hold for the term of his or her natural life, free from all 
claims on account of the debts of the deceased, the 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See In re Wightman, 31 Minn. 168, 169, 17 N.W. 280, 280 (1883). 
 7. Snortum v. Snortum, 155 Minn. 230, 233, 193 N.W. 304, 306 (1923). 
 8. Id. 
 9. 1925 Minn. Laws 174 § 2. 
 10. 1876 Minn. Laws 37 § 1. 
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homestead of such deceased, as such homestead may be 
defined in the statutes relating to homestead 
exemptions.11 
The statute, as newly amended in 1878, specifically referenced 
the exemption statute for a definition of what constituted a 
homestead under the descent statute and courts were directed to 
look to the exemption statute for guidance.12  Courts at that time 
found that a homestead was a dwelling that was owned and 
occupied by the person claiming the homestead.13  The current 
version of the descent of homestead statute does not refer to the 
exemption statute for the definition of what constitutes a 
homestead, and therefore, homestead under the descent statute is 
not defined.14 
By 1894, the homestead statute had been amended again and 
provided, in substance, for the same rights that a surviving spouse 
with children has under the current statute.15  In particular, the law 
in 1894 provided that the homestead descended free from any 
testamentary devise or other disposition to which the spouse had 
not consented in writing and was free from all debt.16  Further, the 
homestead descended to the surviving spouse for the term of his or 
her natural life, and the remainder to the decedent’s children or 
grandchildren by right of representation.17  As the Minnesota 
Supreme Court noted, these early descent of homestead statutes 
were a departure from previous legislative policy and designed to 
provide for the surviving spouse and to preserve the homestead for 
the children, notwithstanding the will of the decedent.18  
Therefore, the rights of a surviving spouse and surviving children 
to an interest in the homestead has a long-standing history in 
Minnesota.  Despite this history, there are surprisingly few cases 
discussing what constitutes a decedent’s homestead or what it 
means to own and occupy a dwelling for homestead purposes.  
Examination of the potentially litigious issues involving the descent 
 
 11. MINN. GEN. ST. c. 46, § 2 (1878).  In re Baillif’s Estate, 40 Minn. 172, 173, 
41 N.W. 1059, 1059 (1889)(discussing whether the house and lot qualified as a 
homestead “within the meaning of section 2, c. 46, Gen. St. 1878”). 
 12. In re Baillif’s Estate, 40 Minn. at 173, 41 N.W. at 1059. 
 13. Id. at 173, 41 N.W. at 1059.  See also MINN. GEN. ST.  c. 68 § 1 (1878). 
 14. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
 15. See MINN. GEN. ST.  § 4470 (1894).  See also Schacht v. Schacht, 86 Minn. 
91, 92, 90 N.W. 127, 128 (1902).  Cf. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402. 
 16.  MINN. GEN. ST. § 4470 (1894). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Schacht, 86 Minn. at 94, 90 N.W. at 129. 
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of a homestead requires an understanding of existing case law and 
attempts by Minnesota courts to define the meaning of homestead 
in a variety of contexts. 
C.  Homestead Defined: “Owned and Occupied” 
There is no explicit definition of the word homestead 
contained within the descent of homestead statute.19  However, the 
homestead statute does indicate that a homestead includes a 
“manufactured home which is the family residence.”20  However, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals has made it very clear that the 
phrase “family residence” contained in the statute is of no import 
to non-mobile dwellings, and that this phrase is simply a 
recognition by the legislature that manufactured homes may be 
homesteads.21  Further, the court of appeals has held that a 
property’s status as a family residence is irrelevant under the 
descent of homestead statute.22 
The court of appeals in Cleys v. Cleys, one of the few cases to 
address the definition of a homestead for purposes of the descent 
statute, looked to Minnesota’s homestead exemption statute which 
protects a debtor’s homestead from attachment and seizure.23  
Therefore, the court in Cleys v. Cleys adopted the homestead 
exemption definition that a house owned and occupied by a debtor 
as the debtor’s dwelling place shall constitute the homestead of the 
debtor and the debtor’s family.24  However, simply stating that a 
homestead is one that is owned and occupied as a dwelling place 
does not end the inquiry.  The court of appeals later held that “the 
test to determine if a house is ‘owned and occupied‘ . . . is whether 
the ownership and occupancy affords “a ‘significant “community 
connection” . . .’ [that allows] the debtor and his or her family . . . 
to be self-sustaining.”25 
The facts in Cleys v. Cleys involved a decedent who resided in a 
resort during the tourist season, stayed at another property he 
 
 19. See MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402 (2000). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Cleys v. Cleys, 363 N.W.2d 65, 70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 22. Id. (citing St. Denis v. Mullen, 157 Minn. 266, 196 N.W. 258 (1923); Rux 
v. Adam, 143 Minn. 35, 172 N.W. 912 (1919); Murphy v. Renner, 99 Minn. 348, 
109 N.W. 593 (1906)). 
 23. See Cleys,  363 N.W.2d at 70 (citing MINN. STAT. § 510.01 (1982)). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id. (citing Denzer v. Prendergast, 267 Minn. 212, 218, 126 N.W.2d. 440, 
444 (1964)). 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss1/6
DUNCAN FORMATTED.DOC 9/6/2002  10:10 PM 
2002] HOMESTEAD LITIGATION 191 
owned for a couple of weeks in the fall and spring, and lived the 
rest of the year in his mother’s home in Illinois.26  The court 
upheld the decision that the resort property was the decedent’s 
homestead by examining specific facts of the case: the decedent 
had occupied the main resort house for a substantial part of the 
year; maintained his personal effects there throughout the year; 
was living in the resort house when he entered the hospital before 
his death; maintained a Minnesota driver’s license; filed Minnesota 
income taxes; and had made declarations that he believed the 
resort property to be his homestead.27  In doing so, the court noted 
that the statute does not require uninterrupted physical presence 
at a dwelling in order to make it one’s homestead.28 
The court in Cleys v. Cleys also notes that another statute 
protects spousal interests in the homestead, specifically with 
reference to filing and recording conveyances made by one spouse 
without the consent of the other during the marriage.29  This 
conveyance statute provides that one spouse may not convey the 
homestead during the marriage unless the other spouse consents 
in writing.30  A spouse may, however, convey property other than 
the homestead that is owned by that spouse without the consent of 
the other.31  A deed of conveyance of the homestead by one spouse 
during the marriage without the other spouse’s written consent is a 
nullity and is void.32  Since this conveyance statute only protects a 
spouse from inter vivos conveyances of the homestead that occur 
during the marriage, and is not relevant to conveyances made prior 
to the marriage or by a testamentary disposition after death, it is of 
little assistance in resolving disputes that may result after death as 
to the descent of the homestead.33  However, the fact that this 
separate conveyance statute protects a spouse from unwanted 
transfers of the homestead during marriage underlies the principle 
noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court that these statutes are 
 
 26. Id. at 68. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 70. 
 29. See Cleys, 363 N.W.2d at 69-70.  See also MINN. STAT. § 507.02 (2000) 
(stating the conveyance of homestead is “subject to the rights of the other spouse 
therein”). 
 30. MINN. STAT. § 507.02. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Rux v. Adam, 143 Minn. 35, 38, 172 N.W. 912, 914 (1919). 
 33. See MINN. STAT. § 507.02.  An examination of restrictions on inter-vivos 
conveyances of the homestead during the marriage is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
7
Duncan: Home Sweet Home? Litigation Aspects to Minnesota's Descent of Hom
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
DUNCAN FORMATTED.DOC 9/6/2002  10:10 PM 
192 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:1 
designed “to preserve the homestead for the family even at the 
sacrifice of just demands.”34 
Although the court in Cleys v. Cleys held that the property’s 
status as a family residence is irrelevant under the descent statute, 
clearly some significant physical presence by the decedent is 
necessary in order to qualify the dwelling as a homestead under the 
descent statute.35  As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in a 1898 
decision, “[a]ctual occupancy, as distinguished from mere 
possession (which may be constructive), is the prominent idea 
associated with the word ‘homestead.’”36  However, the term “actual 
occupancy” must be reasonably construed and does not require 
constant physical presence at the dwelling.37  In fact, a person’s 
absence from a dwelling as a result of some casualty, for business or 
for pleasure has long been recognized not to constitute a removal, 
abandonment or a ceasing of occupancy of a dwelling for 
homestead purposes.38  It has also been held that a parcel of 
property cannot be claimed as a homestead where a person never 
occupies the property as his residence, but rather occupied a 
rented dwelling as his regular place of abode.39  Although the 
appellate courts of this state have never specifically stated that the 
intention of a decedent or owner to make a dwelling his or her 
homestead is a significant consideration, the implication is 
apparent in the courts’ review of the facts of each case.40  For 
example, in Clark v. Dewey, the supreme court found it significant 
that the record amply reflected an intent by the owner to leave the 
premises and to never occupy it again as his home or place of 
abode.41  It should also be noted that if the decedent leaves 
significant property, for example a farm, that the homestead rights 
 
 34. See Holden v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 223 Minn. 550, 559, 27 N.W.2d 
641, 646 (1947). 
 35. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
 36. Clark v. Dewey, 71 Minn. 108, 110, 73 N.W. 639, 639-40 (1898). 
 37. Id. at 110, 73 N.W.2d at 640. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See In re Flanagan’s Estate, 196 Minn. 140, 142, 264 N.W. 433, 434 (1936). 
 40. See id.  See also Clark v. Dewey, 71 Minn. at 110-11, 73 N.W. at 640 and 
Cleys v. Cleys, 363 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 41. See Clark, 71 Minn. at 110-11, 73 N.W. at 640.  It must be noted that this 
case did not involve the descent of homestead statute; but rather a forced sale to 
satisfy a judgment against the owner.  Id. at 110, 73 N.W. at 639.  There are very 
few cases in Minnesota that deal specifically with the concept of homestead under 
the descent statute, which is likely why the court in Cleys v. Cleys looked to the 
homestead exemption statute and associated case law in its analysis of the descent 
statute.  See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. 
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of the surviving spouse are limited to the land which the decedent 
actually devoted to homestead purposes and that was actually 
occupied as the homestead at the time of death.42 
Since the court of appeals, in its most recent and most relevant 
case, used the homestead debtor exemption statute in its analysis of 
what constitutes a homestead for purposes of the descent statute, a 
closer look at the exemption statute may provide guidance for how 
the courts may look at unresolved descent of homestead issues in 
the future.  The homestead exemption statute specifically provides 
that if a debtor is married, the title to the homestead may be vested 
in either spouse and that “[a]ny interest in the land, whether legal 
or equitable, shall constitute ownership, within the meaning of this 
chapter.”43  Under this statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
construed homestead interests liberally.44  For example, in Cargill, a 
160-acre farm, title to which was held by a family farm corporation 
(Hedge Farm, Inc.), the couple who farmed and had a house on 
the property was entitled to claim a homestead exemption in eighty 
acres of the farm upon which the party resided.45  This liberal 
construction of homestead has long been recognized in the State of 
Minnesota.  In another case, the supreme court held that property 
held in trust by J for the benefit of his brother M, which was 
occupied by M as his residence, constituted M’s homestead and he 
was deemed the actual owner of the property even though legal 
title was held by his brother J.46 
Although a dispute may arise as to whether a dwelling and 
parcel of property are in fact a decedent’s homestead, if homestead 
status is conferred, the interests in the homestead vest in the 
surviving spouse and surviving children immediately and absolutely 
upon the decedent’s death and without any act on the survivors’ 
part or the part of the probate court.47 
 
 42. See King v. McCarthy, 54 Minn. 190, 195, 55 N.W. 960, 961 (1893). 
 43. MINN. STAT. § 510.04 (2000). 
 44. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hedge, 358 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), 
aff’d,  375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985). 
 45. Id. at 493. 
 46. See Jelinek v. Stepan, 41 Minn. 412, 43 N.W. 90 (1889). 
 47. See In re Lee, 171 Minn. 182, 185-86, 213 N.W. 736, 737 (1927); In re 
Walberg’s Estate, 130 Minn. 462, 466, 153 N.W. 876, 878 (1915).   Although these 
cases remain good law, under the present descent statute a surviving spouse must 
file a petition for her homestead rights or she will be deemed to consent to a 
contrary disposition of the homestead.  See MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402. 
9
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D.  The Homestead Allowance Under the Uniform Probate Code 
Although not necessarily probative to litigation issues arising 
in the context of the descent of the homestead, it is advisable to 
examine how the Uniform Probate Code, which has been largely 
adopted in Minnesota, addresses the descent of the homestead.  
The Uniform Probate Code, while allowing for some interest by the 
surviving spouse with respect to the homestead, does not give the 
surviving spouse any substantial interest of the homestead in fee, or 
if there are children of the decedent, a life estate.48  Rather, the 
Uniform Probate Code provides a decedent’s surviving spouse a 
homestead allowance in the amount of $15,000.49  If there is no 
surviving spouse, each minor child and dependent of the decedent 
is entitled to the $15,000 homestead allowance divided equally 
among them.50  Like Minnesota, the Uniform Probate Code 
homestead allowance is exempt from all claims against the estate 
and is added to any share passing by will, intestate succession, or 
elective share.51  There is an optional provision in the Uniform 
Probate Code for states that have constitutional provisions for 
either fee title to, or a life estate in, the homestead, which provides 
that the value of the constitutional homestead shall be charged 
against the homestead allowance.52  Clearly Minnesota’s descent of 
homestead statute provides greater security for the surviving spouse 
and may provide the surviving spouse with a greater financial 
benefit as well depending upon whether he or she receives the 
homestead in fee and depending upon the value of the life 
interest.53 
E.  Treatment of the Homestead in Other States 
Other states take a myriad of different approaches with respect 
to a surviving spouse’s interest in the homestead, as well as give a 
variety of different definitions to the term homestead.54  An 
 
 48. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402 (1993). But see MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402 
(2000). 
 49. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402. 
 50. Id. 
 51. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402. 
 52. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402A. 
 53. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 54. An examination of the homestead-related statutes and homestead 
provisions in various state constitutions of all fifty states is well outside the scope of 
this article.  The state statutes discussed in this section are by way of example and 
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examination of some of these differing approaches emphasizes the 
importance of Minnesota’s approach descending the homestead to 
the surviving spouse. 
1.  Varying Approaches to the Homestead Allowance 
The approaches taken by states providing some interest in the 
decedent’s homestead to the surviving spouse can be sorted into 
four categories: a) Uniform Probate Code states; b) constitutional 
or statutory descent homestead states; c) residency during probate 
proceedings or at the discretion of the court; and d) other 
miscellaneous approaches.55 
a.  Uniform Probate Code States 
Numerous states have adopted the homestead allowance 
approach recommended by the Uniform Probate Code.56  The 
amount of the homestead allowance varies from state to state, but 
ranges from $7,500 to $27,000.57  Some states employ a homestead 
allowance in connection with other homestead provisions for the 
surviving spouse that impact the right to the homestead and the 
amount of the allowance.58 
b.  Constitutional or Statutory Homesteads 
This category of states provides either a life estate or fee simple 
rights to the surviving spouse and children.  Minnesota is an 
example of a state providing a statutory right to homestead.59  
Minnesota is fairly unique in that it grants the surviving spouse fee 
 
are not all inclusive of the nuances that exist among the descent of homestead 
statutes in the various states.  For a brief summary of the history and development 
of homestead rights and allowances in the United States see the statutory note 
following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1 (1992).  
 55. Examples of each will be discussed in turn. 
 56. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
 57. Examples of states having homestead allowances and their respective 
amounts include the following: $27,000–ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.402 (Michie 2001); 
$20,000--MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-412 (2001); $18,000--ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2402A 
(West 2001); $15,000–HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-402 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
700.2402 (2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 474.290 (2001); $10,000–ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18-A § 2-401 (2001); $7,500–NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2322 (2001). 
 58. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-5-103 and 2-7-501 to 2-7-509 (2002) ($30,000); 
ALA. CODE § 43-8-110 (2002) ($6,000).  See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying 
text (disscussing these two statutes). 
 59. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
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title to the homestead if there are no children.60  Vermont’s 
homestead statute provides that the decedent’s homestead, not 
exceeding $75,000 in value, shall pass and vest in the surviving 
spouse and be set out to the surviving spouse by the probate 
court.61  These statutes, however, make no provision for the 
surviving children.62  The Vermont Supreme Court has noted that 
the homestead right of a surviving spouse is of paramount 
importance.63  Further, homestead rights take precedence over the 
fundamental right to make a testamentary disposition, and any 
effort to will away the homestead right must fail.64 
Other states provide only a life estate to the surviving spouse.  
Rhode Island, for example, provides only a life estate to the 
surviving spouse and subjects the spouse to any encumbrances on 
the property existing at death.65  Case law in Rhode Island 
invalidates transfers of property into revocable trusts for purposes 
of defeating a surviving spouse’s homestead right on the ground 
that such a transfer is “illusory.”66  New Hampshire also provides a 
life estate in the surviving spouse, and has a statutory provision 
specifying that a conveyance of real property by deed to trustees of 
a revocable trust shall not result in the loss of homestead rights by 
the person executing the deed, unless the deed contains an express 
release of homestead rights.67  Several states, however, provide 
simply a right of occupancy, rather than the vesting of a life estate, 
and when the surviving spouse ceases to occupy the homestead, 
whether before or upon death, his or her rights terminate.68  
Therefore, under these provisions, once a spouse ceases to occupy 
the homestead it descends according to the other laws of descent.69  
Florida is an example of a constitutional homestead state, which 
provides that the homestead shall not be “subject to devise if the 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 101, 105 (2001). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Budde v. Pierce, 375 A.2d 984, 986 (Vt. 1977). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-25-2(a) (2001).  See also ARK. CODE. ANN. § 28-39-
201 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-104 (2001). 
 66. See Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 348-50 (R.I. 1997).  Although the result is 
the same, this is a different approach taken by the tentative draft of the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 25. See infra notes 114-122 and accompanying text. 
 67. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480:3-a (1992) and 480:9 (Supp. 2001). 
 68. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.070 (Michie 2001). 
 69. See id. 
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owner is survived by a spouse or minor child.”70 
c. Residency During Probate Proceedings 
Numerous states have separate provisions allowing a surviving 
spouse to possess and occupy the homestead during the pendency 
of the probate proceedings or for an indefinite period of time at 
the discretion of the court.  For example, Connecticut allows the 
family of the decedent to remain in the dwelling house occupied by 
the decedent at the time of his or her death, and allows them to 
occupy all land and buildings connecting with the dwelling house 
for as long as the court deems necessary for the family’s 
convenience and comfort until the property is sold, distributed or 
otherwise disposed of.71  South Dakota allows a surviving spouse to 
continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead until it is 
otherwise disposed of by law.72  Further, upon the death of both 
spouses “the children may continue to possess and occupy the 
whole homestead until the youngest child becomes of age.”73  Iowa 
allows a surviving spouse to occupy the homestead until it is 
otherwise disposed of according to law.74  However, a surviving 
spouse in Iowa is also able to elect to retain the homestead for life 
in lieu of a dower interest in the real estate of decedent.75  The 
purpose of the occupancy statute in Iowa is merely a protection for 
the surviving spouse to remain in possession of the homestead 
prior to her taking her distributive share of the decedent’s estate or 
electing a life interest in the homestead.76   
d.  Other Miscellaneous Approaches 
A number of states use a combination of approaches to the 
homestead allowance and a surviving spouse’s interest in the 
homestead.  For example, Wyoming provides a homestead 
allowance equal to the amount of the homestead exemption of 
$30,000.77  If the appraisal of the property determines the value to 
be less than $30,000, the court shall order the homestead set off to 
 
 70. See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.4015 (2001).  See also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a). 
 71. CONN. GEN. ST. § 45a-321 (2001). 
 72. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-31-13 (Michie 2001). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See IOWA CODE § 561.11 (2001). 
 75. See id. at § 561.12. 
 76. See Wadle v. Boston Market Co., 191 N.W. 528, 529 (1923). 
 77. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-5-103, 2-7-504, and 2-7-508 (Michie 2001). 
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the persons entitled to it.78  However, if the appraisal determines 
the value to be greater than $30,000, the property will be divided if 
possible, and if not possible, the property will be sold and the 
proceeds divided to the persons having an interest in the 
homestead.79  Alabama is an example of a state that provides a 
homestead allowance, but also provides a constitutional right to the 
homestead in the family home.80 
2.  How Several States Define Homestead 
Among the states that provide some occupancy, life estate, or 
fee interest in the homestead to the surviving spouse or children, 
several of the states have undertaken to define homestead within 
the statute or within the state’s homestead exemption statute.  New 
Hampshire, for example, defines the homestead exemption in the 
same manner as Minnesota in that a homestead is defined as 
property owned and occupied as a dwelling.81  A bankruptcy case 
citing this statute held that for the creation of the homestead right, 
the occupancy must be actual and physical in nature, but that 
temporary absence with no intent to abandon the property may still 
be sufficient.82  Similarly, the Vermont homestead exemption 
statute defines the homestead as the dwelling house, outbuildings 
and land used as such.83  Again, ownership and occupancy have 
been held to be the key inquiries,84 but a significant absence will 
not destroy the homestead character of the property if there is 
shown an intent to return to the homestead.85 
Iowa’s homestead exemption statute provides that “the 
homestead must embrace the house used as a home by the owner,” 
and if the owner has two or more houses used as such the owner 
may select which one will retain the homestead status.86  Again, 
occupancy of the dwelling house, except when the owner is 
temporarily absent with the intent to return, is essential to claim 
 
 78. Id. at § 2-7-506. 
 79. Id. at § 2-7-507. 
 80. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-110 (2001).  See also ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. X, § 
208. 
 81. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:1 (2001).  Cf. MINN. STAT. § 510.01 (2000). 
 82. See In re Eckols, 63 B.R. 523, 524-25 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986). 
 83. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (2001). 
 84. In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893, 894-96 (Bankr. D.Vt. 1987). 
 85. See In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.Vt. 1984). 
 86. See IOWA CODE § 561.1 (2001). 
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the homestead right.87  However, once a homestead is established 
in Iowa an intent to occupy that would be insufficient to create a 
homestead right in the first instance is nonetheless sufficient to 
continue the homestead status.88  The court in McClain’s Estate 
stated that once a homestead is established, it is presumed to 
continue.89  A Mississippi statute attempts to narrow the definition 
of home and homestead by defining these terms as the dwelling 
actually occupied as the primary home of a family group that is 
owned by the head of the family.90  Florida’s statutes do not define 
the term homestead, but do define the term owner to include the 
grantor of a revocable trust and in the same manner as if the 
interest held in the revocable trust was owned by the grantor.91  
Idaho more specifically defines the term homestead as consisting of 
the dwelling house, and the land upon which it sits, in which the 
owner resides or intends to reside.92  This statute further expands 
on the definition of homestead by including unimproved land 
owned with the intention of placing a house on it and residing 
therein.93  Clearly Idaho places great importance on the intent of 
the property owner claiming homestead status. 
Although the definitions utilized by other states with similar 
homestead rights to the surviving spouse do not resolve all 
ambiguity as to the meaning of the term, they are illustrative of the 
argument that the homestead not only encompasses actual physical 
presence in the dwelling, but also an intent to make the dwelling 
one’s home even if absent from it for significant periods of time.  
Further, at least two states acknowledge that the element of 
ownership is satisfied even if the homestead is held by the deceased 
grantor’s revocable trust.94 
 
 87. See Berner v. Dellinger, 222 N.W. 370, 371 (Iowa 1928). 
 88. See In re McClain’s Estate, 262 N.W. 666, 668 (Iowa 1935).  This approach 
is very similar, if not identical, to the presumption given in domicile cases.  See 
infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-33-19 (2001). 
 91. See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.4015(2)(a) (2001). 
 92. See IDAHO CODE § 55-1001 (Michie 2001). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See supra notes 67, 91 and accompanying text. 
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III. LITIGATING THE ISSUE OF WHAT CONSTITUTES THE HOMESTEAD 
A.  Generally 
As discussed in the hypotheticals in the introduction of this 
article, several litigation scenarios can arise with respect to the 
homestead descent statute.95  This section will address three 
potentially litigious areas involving the homestead.96  The first area 
of potential litigation involves the case where the spouses are living 
separately at the time of death of one of them and whether an 
argument may be raised that the surviving spouse should not be 
entitled to the dwelling in which the deceased spouse occupied at 
the time of his or her death.  The second area of potential 
litigation involves the revocable trust hypothetical and whether a 
dwelling transferred into a revocable trust prior to marriage is 
nevertheless owned by the decedent for purposes of claiming right 
of descent to the homestead.  This area will be examined by 
looking at the evolution of the law of trusts as applied to spousal 
rights as reflected in various uniform statements of the law.  The 
third area of potential litigation involves aspects of the trust and 
remodeling hypotheticals and arguments involving the failure to 
occupy the dwelling at the time of death. 
B.  To Whose Homestead Does the Statute Refer: Spouses Living 
Separately 
When spouses reside separately at the time of death of one, 
there is a natural temptation on the part of many personal 
representatives of the deceased spouse, and their attorney for that 
matter, to argue that the surviving spouse should not receive fee 
title, or if there are children, a life estate, in the deceased spouse’s 
homestead.  This is particularly true if the reason for living apart 
involves a breakdown of the marital relationship that has yet to 
culminate in a divorce decree.  Litigation may result based upon an 
argument that the surviving spouse has his or her own homestead 
and would therefore be inequitably benefited by receiving a 
 
 95. See supra Part I. 
 96. These three areas are not necessarily inclusive of all potential litigation 
involving the descent of homestead statute.  The author has selected these three 
areas because of their similarity to actual cases he has litigated.  The facts of the 
hypotheticals have been changed to protect client confidentiality. 
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homestead that he or she does not need.  Further, the legislative 
purpose of protecting the spouse from losing the roof over his or 
her head does not apply to a surviving spouse who owns his or her 
separate homestead.  Although the lack of the surviving spouse’s 
need of the decedent’s homestead as compared to the purpose of 
the descent statute would seem to favor not granting homestead 
rights, the clear implication under Minnesota law is that the 
surviving spouse would nonetheless receive the decedent’s 
homestead.97 
In a 1923 decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the 
homestead of a decedent who was not living with his spouse but 
who was living with another woman who he unlawfully attempted to 
marry, descended to his lawful wife for life and the remainder to 
their children.98  ’The court was not swayed by the fact that the 
decedent and his unlawful wife lived together in the homestead for 
twenty-four years.99  In an earlier case, the same result was reached 
when the court held that a life estate to decedent’s homestead 
descended to his lawful wife with whom he was not living, with the 
remainder to her children, despite the fact that the decedent lived 
with another woman who was not his wife, but with whom he had 
six children.100  The appellate courts of this state have not recently 
ruled on a case with similar facts as St. Denis and Rux.  One can only 
speculate as to whether the courts would be constrained by the 
language of the descent of homestead statute to rule in favor of the 
lawful surviving spouse, or whether the courts would carve an 
exception based upon a definition of the term homestead for 
purposes of rectifying a potentially inequitable result. 
Further support for the argument that a spouse living 
separately still has an interest in the homestead may be found in 
the residential property tax statutes.  A residential homestead for 
property tax purposes is defined as residential real estate that is 
occupied and used for the purposes of a homestead by its owner.101  
This property tax statute provides some persuasive support to the 
theory that a dwelling does not lose its homestead quality merely 
because the husband and wife are not living together.102  
 
 97. See supra notes 95-96, infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text. 
 98. See St. Denis v. Mullen, 157 Minn. 266, 268, 196 N.W. 258, 259 (1923). 
 99. Id. at 269, 196 N.W. at 259. 
 100. See Rux v. Adam, 143 Minn. 35, 38, 172 N.W. 912, 913-914 (1919). 
 101. See MINN. STAT. § 273.124, subd. 1(a) (Supp. 2002). 
 102. Id. at subd. 1(e). 
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Specifically, when a parcel of property is owned by a person who is 
married, “the assessor must not deny homestead treatment in 
whole or in part if only one of the spouses occupies the property 
and the other spouse is absent due to:  (1) marriage dissolution 
proceedings, (2) legal separation, . . .or (4) other personal 
circumstances causing the spouses to live separately. . . .”103 
While there may be room in the future for an equitable 
argument for a change in the law with respect to whether a 
surviving spouse who lives separately from the deceased spouse 
should receive the deceased’s homestead, the issue of financial 
need has been more recently addressed by the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals.  In a 1990 decision, the court held that the guardian of an 
incapacitated surviving spouse, who had sufficient assets to support 
her round-the-clock nursing care needs for the remainder of her 
life expectancy, could nevertheless exercise the surviving spouse’s 
right to the homestead.104  The court’s decision was not impacted 
by the fact that by the time the matter reached the appellate court 
the surviving spouse has died.105  Clearly, financial need of a 
surviving spouse is not a consideration in determining whether he 
or she takes an interest in the homestead,106 and it appears that if a 
dwelling is determined to be the decedent’s homestead, a surviving 
spouse’s right to take an interest in it under the descent statute is 
absolute.107 
C.  The Meaning of “Ownership” 
In the hypothetical described in the introduction to this article 
an issue is raised as to whether title to a dwelling that is transferred 
inter-vivos into a revocable trust before marriage is considered 
owned by the grantor of the trust for purposes of the surviving 
spouse’s claim to a homestead interest in the property.108  Since 
there is no Minnesota case law on this issue, the question is best 
examined by a discussion of how various Restatements of the Law and 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. See In re Estate of Wentworth, 452 N.W.2d 714, 716-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1990). 
 105. Id. at 719. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See supra Part I.  Note that the transfer would have to be made before the 
marriage since the homestead conveyance statute would nullify any transfer of the 
homestead into the trust during the marriage if the surviving spouse did not 
consent to the transfer in writing.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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the Uniform Trust Code resolve this issue.  As the following discussion 
will indicate, there has been a fundamental shift with respect to 
whether transfers by one spouse into a revocable trust defeat the 
spousal rights of the other spouse.  Examination will also be made 
into arguments that the failure to occupy the dwelling at the time 
of death may result in litigation under the homestead descent 
statute as well. 
1.  Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts 
The increased frequency of use of revocable inter vivos trusts 
as an estate planning tool is obvious to all practitioners and 
generally to the public as a whole.  Property transferred into a 
revocable trust is, of course, no longer titled or retained in the 
name of the individual grantor of the trust, but rather is titled in 
the name of the trustee of the revocable trust.109  Further, title to 
property held by a trustee vests with a successor trustee upon 
qualification of the successor, if the trust so provides, or upon the 
appointment of a successor trustee by the district court.110  A 
grantor will commonly transfer title to his or her residence to the 
trustees of the revocable trust at the time the trust is created and 
funded and during the lifetime of the grantor.  This transfer of title 
from the grantor to the trustee of a trust, and potentially to any 
number of successor trustees, raises an argument that the 
decedent, at his or her death, did not own the real estate in which a 
surviving spouse claims a homestead interest because that real 
estate was not titled in the decedent’s name.  In other words, the 
personal representative of a decedent’s estate may argue that the 
decedent did not own the real estate held by the trustee of the 
revocable trust, and consequently there is no homestead for the 
surviving spouse to receive.111  Various uniform codes, restatements, 
and statutes from other states have changed positions over time as 
to whether a surviving spouse’s rights to a portion of a deceased 
spouse’s estate can be defeated by the transfer of property into an 
inter vivos revocable trust.112  Although a spouse’s right to an 
elective share or other statutory allowance is typically the subject of 
 
 109. See generally  Minnesota Trustees’ Powers Act, MINN. STAT. § 
501B.81(detailing the enumerated powers of a trustee). 
 110. See MINN. STAT. § 501B.08 (2000). 
 111. This issue of ownership with respect to the descent of a homestead has 
not been the subject of any appellate court  decisions in the State of Minnesota. 
 112. See discussion infra Parts III.C-III.D. 
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litigation involving the inter vivos transfer of assets into a revocable 
trust, the analysis can be applied equally to the surviving spouse’s 
rights to a homestead under Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-
402.113 
a.  The Restatement of Trusts Approach 
The law of trusts has undergone substantial development and 
change since the use of revocable inter vivos trusts have become 
commonplace in estate planning and, in fact, routinely serve as will 
substitutes.  Legal developments with respect to revocable trusts, 
and the use of trust assets to satisfy statutory allowances, are 
highlighted by the change of position between the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts and the tentative draft to Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts.114  Specifically, the tentative draft to Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts provides that “a revocable inter-vivos trust is ordinarily 
subject to substantive restrictions on testation and to rules of 
construction and other rules applicable to testamentary 
dispositions, and in other respects the property of such a trust is 
ordinarily treated as if it owned by the settlor.”115  The Reporter’s 
Notes to this provision state that: 
 The position stated in these Comments and in 
Subsection (2) differ fundamentally from the positions 
taken in prior Restatements of Trusts. 
 Thus, Restatement, Second, Trusts § 57, Comment d 
stated: “The rule stated in this section [that revocable 
trusts are nontestamentary and valid] is applicable 
although the trust is one which could not be created by 
will . . . . [¶]Thus, if it is provided by statute that the wife 
of a testator shall be entitled to a certain portion of his 
 
 113. The issue of ownership of revocable trust assets for purposes of defeating 
a surviving spouse’s elective share rights does not arise in Minnesota given the 
adoption of the concept of an augmented estate against which a surviving spouse 
may make an election.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 524.2-201 to -203.  See also UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -203. (11th ed. 1993).  Specifically, transfers made by 
the decedent to a revocable trust during the decedent’s lifetime would be 
included in the augmented estate as a nonprobate transfer to others.  See MINN. 
STAT. § 524.2-205.  As the descent of the homestead is separately addressed by 
Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-402, it is excluded from computation of the value 
of the augmented estate.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 524.2-204 to –207. 
 114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959) and RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). 
 115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF REVOCABLE 
INTER VIVOS TRUST § 25 (2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). 
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estate of which she cannot be deprived by his will, a 
married man can nevertheless transfer his property inter 
vivos in trust and his widow will not be entitled on his 
death to a share of the property so transferred, even 
though he reserves a life estate and power to revoke or 
modify the trust.”116 
The preceding quotation illustrates the position taken by the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts that a deceased spouse could 
deprive his surviving spouse of her statutory rights by transferring 
his property into a revocable inter vivos trust.117  However, 
comments d and e of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts further 
provide that “since the prior restatement [Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts] there has been significant change in case law and especially 
in legislative policy with respect to . . . matters of spousal protection 
and the rights of creditors.”118 
Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts has reversed its 
position on the ability of a surviving spouse to satisfy her statutory 
allowances with revocable trust assets by stating: 
[I]ncreasingly, statutes and case law in the various states 
are coming to recognize, as this Restatement provides, 
that the rights of the spouses and creditors of testators 
and settlors of revocable trusts are fundamentally alike, 
because both the testator and the settlor have retained 
their complete control over the property that is subject to 
the will or trust instrument.  Similarly, whatever the 
technicalities of concept and terminology, the interests 
the revocable trust beneficiaries will receive on the death 
of the settlor should receive the same treatment and, 
generally at least, should be subject to the same rules of 
construction as the “expectancies” of devisees and 
legatees. 
 Thus, this Restatement recognizes and gives effect to a 
property owner’s right to chose among different forms 
and procedures for disposition of property.  Yet it seeks to 
treat functional equivalents similarly, and not to allow 
choice of a form either to provide an escape from serious, 
substantive policies or to cause the loss of properly 
relevant aids in essentially constructional matters.  Such a 
 
 116. Id. at Reporter’s Notes d and e (brackets and symbols in original).  Note 
that Comment d referred to in this quotation, should in fact refer to Comment c.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 57 n. 112 at cmt. c (1959). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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policy of treating testamentary trusts and their settlors and 
beneficiaries in like manner to the treatment accorded 
testators and will beneficiaries, both during life and after 
death of the settlor or testator, has long been explicit in 
the federal income and transfer tax systems. Early, 
traditional, and still developing doctrine in trust and 
probate law has been neither so clear nor so consistent. 
 In brief, the fundamental and pervasive policy 
underlying this section and related to the rules of this 
Restatement is that diverse forms of revocable trusts (i) 
are valid without compliance with Wills Act formalities but 
(ii) absent persuasive reason for departure, are subject to 
the same restrictions (such as spousal rights) and other 
rules and constructional aids that are applicable to wills. 119 
Although the change of position represents a fundamental 
shift from the common law and second Restatement, these 
comments to Restatement (Third) of Trusts, section 25, reveal that 
this change is simply an acknowledgment that the very nature and 
use of revocable trusts have changed, and therefore, common sense 
dictates that the law with respect to claims against trust assets must 
also change.120  In fact, the comments point out that other areas of 
law recognized the development of the inter vivos revocable trust as 
a common estate planning tool and allow creditors to attach trust 
assets to enforce debts of the individual, and permit the IRS to 
enforce tax obligations owed by an individual on that person’s 
revocable trust assets.121  The reasoning behind the rule allowing a 
surviving spouse to attach assets of a decedent’s revocable trust is 
really one of basic common sense and is best described by the 
above-quoted phrase, “treat functional equivalents similarly.”122 
b.  The Restatement of Property (Donative Transfers) 
Approach 
Further support for this shift is found in the Restatement 
 
 119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 25, cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1996) (citing I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (income tax), §§ 2036 and 3038 (estate tax), § 2511 
with Treasury Regulation, § 25.2511-2(c) (gift tax) (internal citation omitted), and 
§ 2652(a) (generation-skipping transfer tax) (parenthetical information in 
original)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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(Second) of Property: Donative Transfers.123  The Restatement 
provides that: 
An inter vivos donative transfer to others than the donor’s 
spouse that is a substitute for a will, or that is revocable by 
the donor at the time of the donor’s death, is subject to 
spousal rights of the donor’s spouse in the transferred 
property that would accrue to the donor’s spouse on the 
donor’s death if the transfer had been made by the 
donor’s will.124 
Therefore, this Restatement also recognizes that a revocable 
trust should not deprive a surviving spouse of her statutory spousal 
rights.125  Although this Restatement is primarily concerned with a 
surviving spouse’s right to elective share, reference is also made in 
the Comments to a statutory right to the homestead.126  This section 
of the Restatement on the law of donative transfers is also 
referenced in the tentative draft to the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts.127 
c. The Uniform Trust Code Approach 
Although the fundamental shift in position of the Restatement 
on the law of trusts is in a tentative draft format, further and 
compelling evidence that the law of trusts has developed to subject 
assets of a decedent’s revocable trust to statutory allowances is 
provided in the recently approved Uniform Trust Code (drafted by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws).128  Specifically, the Uniform Trust Code provides that: 
After the death of a settlor, and subject to the settlor’s 
right to direct the source from which liabilities will be 
paid, the property of a trust that was revocable at the 
settlor’s death is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors, 
costs of administration of the settlor’s estate, the expenses 
of the settlor’s funeral and disposal of remains, and 
[statutory allowances] to a surviving spouse and children 
 
 123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 34.1(3) 
(1992). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at cmt. (k) on § 3. 
 127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF REVOCABLE 
INTER VIVOS TRUST § 25(2) at Reporter’s Notes d and e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1996) (approved and recommended for enactment in all states). 
 128. UNIF. TRUST CODE: CREDITOR’S CLAIMS AGAINST SETTLOR, § 505 (2000). 
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to the extent the settlor’s probate estate is inadequate to 
satisfy those claims, costs, expenses, and [allowances].129 
The comments to the final draft of Section 505 discuss the 
rationale behind the provision subjecting trust assets to claims for 
statutory allowances by a surviving spouse: 
Subsection (a)(3) recognizes that a revocable trust is 
usually employed as a will substitute.  As such, the trust 
assets, following the death of the settlor, should be subject 
to the settlor’s debts and other charges.  However, in 
accordance with traditional doctrine, the assets of the 
settlor’s probate estate must normally be first exhausted 
before the assets of the revocable trust can be reached. 
This section does not attempt to address the procedural 
issues raised by the need to first exhaust the decedent’s 
probate estate to reach the assets of the revocable trust.  
Nor does this section address the priority of the creditor 
claims or the possible liability of the decedent’s other 
nonprobate assets for the decedent’s debts and other 
charges . . . as long as the rights of the creditor or family 
member claiming a statutory allowance are not impaired, 
the settlor is free to shift liability from the probate estate 
to the revocable trust.130 
The Uniform Trust Code, including section 505 with the 
statutory allowance language, was introduced in both the 
Minnesota Senate and Minnesota House of Representatives during 
the 2001-2002 legislative session.131  As of the date of publication of 
this article, the Senate bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and the House bill has been referred to the House Civil 
Law Committee.132 
D.  The Meaning of “Occupied” 
As noted in the introductory hypotheticals, disputes may also 
arise as to whether a deceased spouse occupied a dwelling at the 
time of his or her death sufficient to make that dwelling a 
 
 129. Id. at § 505(3) (brackets in original). 
 130. UNIF. TRUST CODE: CREDITOR’S CLAIMS AGAINST SETTLOR, Comment to § 
505 (2000). 
 131. See S.F. 2384, 82nd Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2001-2002); H.F. 2540, 82nd Leg. 
Sess. (Minn. 2001-2002). 
 132. S. Journal, 55th Day, 82nd Leg. Sess. 3642 (Minn. 2001-2002); and H. 
Journal, 56th Day, 82nd Leg. Sess. 5033 (Minn. 2001-2002). 
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homestead.133  These issues, as well as potential arguments for 
expanding the concept of occupancy for purposes of the 
homestead descent statute, are more fully addressed in other 
sections of this article.134  The cases that have addressed the 
occupancy requirement of homestead reveal that physical presence 
at the dwelling is a necessity, but that a temporary absence, if 
coupled with an intent to return, will not defeat occupancy.135  
Litigation arises when there is an absence from the dwelling and a 
dispute exists as to whether the absence is temporary or permanent 
and whether the absent spouse intends to return to the dwelling. 
In the hypothetical where the deceased spouse is absent from 
the homestead due to remodeling of the home, it may be argued 
that the absence is temporary and for a definitive period of time.  
That is, the spouse is only absent from the homestead for the 
specific period of time that the work on the home is being 
completed and, arguably, the intent to return when the work is 
complete seems fairly clear.  However, questions may arise whether 
an elderly spouse who has been a resident of a nursing home for 
the past year is only temporarily absent from the homestead.  Is a 
spouse with advancing Alzheimer’s ever going to return from the 
nursing home to her homestead?  If the spouse in the nursing 
home was asked where her home was, would she identify her 
homestead, and is this relevant to showing intent to return?  How 
should the court approach the issue of a terminally ill spouse who 
is admitted to a hospital or hospice facility with no hope or 
expectation of ever returning to the homestead?  Certainly the law 
does not require a person to die in their home to retain a 
homestead classification, but the question of to what extent the 
circumstances of a person’s life, and often death, may impact a 
determination of their homestead may be difficult to answer.  
These are some of the myriad of issues that may give rise to 
litigation under the homestead descent statute, and unless the 
understanding of occupancy is expanded or the presumption that 
homestead status continues once established is adopted, these 
issues will continue to arise and outcomes will vary according to the 
specific facts of each case.136 
 
 133. See supra Part I. 
 134. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text. 
 135. Id.  See also infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
 136. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text. 
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IV. AVOIDING LITIGATION OVER THE HOMESTEAD 
There are three statutory mechanisms a practitioner can utilize 
to assist a client in preventing litigation over the homestead when 
the client does not want the homestead to descend to the client’s 
surviving spouse or surviving children. 
A.  Antenuptial and Postnuptial Contracts: Minn. Stat. § 519.11 
Prior to the solemnization of a marriage, a couple may enter 
into an antenuptial contract that determines what rights each party 
has in nonmarital property upon dissolution, legal separation, or 
the termination of the contract upon the death of one spouse.137  
Further, the antenuptial contract may bar the surviving spouse 
from claiming rights that he or she would otherwise have against 
the decedent’s estate, even though the estate is not a party to the 
agreement.138  Prior to entering an antenuptial contract, certain 
requirements must be met.139  First, there must be a full and fair 
disclosure of the earnings and property of each party.140  Second, 
both parties must have had an opportunity to consult with legal 
counsel of their choosing.141  There are also requirements to ensure 
the proper execution of an antenuptial contract.142  The agreement 
must be in writing, executed in the presence of two witnesses, 
acknowledged by the parties, executed before a notary public, and 
signed before the day of the wedding.143  A power of attorney may 
not be used to execute an antenuptial agreement.144  An 
amendment to an antenuptial agreement may only be made 
through a validly executed postnuptial agreement.145 
The requirements for a valid postnuptial agreement were 
 
 137. See MINN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 1 (2000). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  See also infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text for an examination 
of what constitutes full and fair disclosure. 
 141. Id. As a practical note, if one spouse refuses to retain counsel, the 
attorney for the other should amply document their file with correspondence to 
the unrepresented spouse of his or her right to counsel and a notification that the 
attorney is not providing legal advice to the unrepresented spouse.  Further, the 
agreement should acknowledge that the unrepresented spouse is waiving his or 
her right to counsel. 
 142. See MINN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 2 (2000). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See MINN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 2a. 
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recently amended during the 2001-2002 Minnesota legislative 
session.146  Several requirements for postnuptial contracts were 
unchanged by the recent amendments.  For example, a postnuptial 
contract must comply with all of the requirements for a valid 
antenuptial contract, must be procedurally and substantively fair 
and equitable at the time of execution and enforcement, must be 
executed in the same manner as antenuptial contracts, and must 
not determine child support or child custody.147  Further, both 
spouses must be represented by separate legal counsel, as opposed 
to the antenuptial requirement that both parties must merely be 
allowed the opportunity to consult with counsel of their 
choosing.148  The recent amendment to the postnuptial contract 
statute is nevertheless a significant change that may make its use 
more widespread.  Prior to the amendment, in order for a 
postnuptial contract to be valid, each of the spouses had to have 
marital property, nonmarital property, or a combination of both 
with a net value exceeding $1,200,000.149  Obviously, this lessened 
the usefulness and frequency of use of the postnuptial statute.  
Also, the previous statute provided that if either party commences 
an action for dissolution or legal separation within two years of the 
date of execution of the postnuptial contract the agreement is not 
valid or enforceable.150  The recent amendment eliminated the 
monetary requirement.151  This change may have the effect of 
increasing the frequency of postnuptial contracts given that 
couples with fewer assets now have this option.  The amendment 
also modified the provision that voided the agreement if either 
spouse commenced a dissolution or legal separation within two 
years.152  The statute now states that if either party commences a 
dissolution proceeding or proceeding for legal separation the 
agreement is presumed to be unenforceable.153  This presumption 
is rebuttable, however, if the spouse seeking to enforce the 
postnuptial contract can establish that the contract is fair and 
 
 146. See 2002 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 338 (West); see also MINN. STAT. § 
519.11, subd. 1a. 
 147.  MINN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 1a(2)(b). 
 148. Id. at subd. 1a(2)(c). 
 149. See id. at  subd. 1a(2)(d). 
 150. Id. at subd. 1a(2)(e). 
 151. See 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 338, sec. 1 (West). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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equitable.154  The availability of antenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements as a means of avoiding litigation after death may be 
extremely important for practitioners in advising their clients on 
wealth transfer and estate planning. 
B.  Waiver of Right to Elect and of Other Rights: Minn. Stat. § 524.2-
213 
Minnesota’s probate code provides another mechanism by 
which a spouse can avoid litigation over the descent of the 
homestead by having his or her spouse execute a waiver of the right 
to election and of other rights.155  Minnesota’s waiver of spousal 
rights statute provides: 
The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights 
of the surviving spouse to the homestead, exempt 
property, and family allowance, or any of them, may be 
waived, wholly or partially, after marriage, by a written 
contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the party waiving 
after fair disclosure.  Unless it provides to the contrary, a 
waiver of “all rights,” or equivalent language, in the 
property or estate of a spouse is a waiver only of the right 
to the elective share.  Any waiver prior to marriage must 
be made pursuant to § 519.11.156 
The significant issue for the practicioner with respect to the 
homestead is that if the homestead right is being waived, it must 
include specific language to that effect.157  Also of note is the 
requirement that only the spouse waiving rights needs to execute 
the document.158  Unlike antenuptial or postnuptial contracts, the 
waiver provision does not have witnessing or attestation 
requirements.159  However, the practitioner should recommend 
that any waiver be witnessed and notarized to avoid any argument 
that the signature is not that of the waiving spouse and to assist in 
the defense of a lack of capacity or undue influence claim that may 
be made after the death of the waiving party.  Finally, it should be 
noted that the waiver statute requires only “fair disclosure” of 
assets, whereas the antenuptial and postnuptial statute requires full 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See MINN. STAT. § 524.2-213 (2000). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. UNIF. TRUST CODE: CREDITOR’S CLAIMS AGAINST SETTLOR, § 505 (2000).  Cf. 
MINN. STAT. § 519.11 (2000). 
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and fair disclosure.160 
While no appellate court in Minnesota has yet drawn a 
distinction between the differing terms used in these two statutes, 
an argument may be made that the waiver statute requires a 
disclosure that is less detailed than does the antenuptial statute.161  
A justification for a lesser standard of disclosure may be that a 
spouse who executes a waiver of spousal rights is in a better 
position to have information as to what assets the non-waiving 
spouse owns.  Whereas, in the antenuptial setting a prospective 
spouse may not have the type of access or information prior to the 
marriage as to the other prospective spouse’s assets.  Another 
justification for a lesser standard may be that the danger of 
coercion by one spouse against another, by for example 
threatening to call off the wedding, is diminished when the waiver 
is executed during the marriage.  The waiver of spousal rights is a 
very effective way to minimize the chance of expensive and 
protracted litigation, and may be easier to procure if a spouse is 
reluctant to execute an antenuptial contract because he or she 
desires to protect their interests in the event of a divorce. 
C.  Miscellaneous Considerations for the Practitioner 
1.  Adequate Inquiry Into Your Client’s Wishes 
Invariably, if litigation erupts over the surviving spouse’s rights 
upon the death of a client, to the homestead or otherwise, there 
will be no end to the individuals willing to testify as to what were 
the decedent’s wishes.  The surviving spouse will be prepared to 
testify that the decedent told her on one or more occasions that the 
house will be hers upon his death.  Whereas, the personal 
representative or trustee, who also happens to be an heir, will be 
ready to testify that the decedent did not want his wife to have 
anything from his estate.  It is therefore incumbent upon the 
practitioner to thoroughly ascertain the estate planning client’s 
wishes, particularly with respect to the homestead, which in many 
cases may be the most significant asset in the estate.  By 
understanding the client’s wishes with respect to what the surviving 
spouse will claim upon the client’s death, the practitioner is better 
 
 160. Compare MINN. STAT. § 524.2-213, and MINN. STAT. § 519.11. See also 
discussion infra at notes 166-86 and accompanying text. 
 161. See  discussion infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text. 
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able to offer alternatives such as a waiver or postnuptial contract.  
Also, by confirming the client’s wishes apart from a testamentary 
instrument, through correspondence or a videotaped meeting, the 
practitioner may also prevent a decedent’s heirs from attempting to 
obstruct a surviving spouse’s claims for spousal rights when the 
intent and expectation of the decedent was that his surviving 
spouse would receive the full benefit of her statutory entitlements. 
2.  Filing Petition Asserting Homestead Rights 
Although Minnesota case law indicates that a surviving 
spouse’s life estate or fee interest in the homestead, as the case may 
be, vests upon the decedent’s death, the surviving spouse must still 
take an action to assert and preserve this right under the descent of 
homestead statute.162  The descent statute provides that a surviving 
spouse is deemed to consent to any testamentary or other 
disposition of the homestead to which the spouse has not 
previously consented to in writing unless a petition is filed asserting 
the homestead rights in the same manner as a petition for an 
elective share.163  The time limit for filing a petition for elective 
share is nine months from the date of death, or six months after 
admission of the will to probate, whichever is later to occur.164  An 
extension may be sought from the court to extend the time for 
making an election.165 
3.  Fair Disclosure in Executing a Waiver 
As previously discussed, the disclosure requirement of a waiver 
of spousal rights, including the right to the homestead, may be 
waived only “after fair disclosure,” whereas the antenuptial and 
postnuptial contract statute requires full and fair disclosure.166  
Since there are no cases discussing what fair disclosure means 
under the waiver statute it is unclear whether the same standard for 
disclosure applies to waivers of spousal rights and antenuptial 
contracts.  Arguments may be made that the waiver statute requires 
a lesser amount of disclosure than does an antenuptial or 
 
 162. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  See also MINN. STAT. § 524.2-
402(d (2000). 
 163. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-402(d). 
 164. See MINN. STAT. § 524.2-211. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra notes 140, 161 and accompanying text. 
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postnuptial contract.167  However, for the practitioner intent on 
avoiding litigation for his or her client on the issue of whether a 
waiver is void for lack of fair disclosure, the best approach is to read 
the two statutes as requiring the same level of disclosure. 
Therefore, an examination as to what constitutes full and fair 
disclosure is warranted. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has said that the preferred 
method of fully and fairly disclosing earnings and property under 
the antenuptial statute is to attach complete and detailed financial 
statements.168  However, the court did not make this a 
requirement.169  The court in McKee-Johnson found that the 
antenuptial agreement met the requirements for procedural 
fairness in that the wife was advised of, and waived, her right to 
consult with independent counsel and that the agreement was 
signed upon full and fair disclosure.170  With regard to full and fair 
disclosure, attached to the antenuptial agreement were detailed 
and complete financial statements in which both parties disclosed 
assets, liabilities, net worth, and earnings.171  The court said that 
they had previously suggested these types of statements and other 
jurisdictions also looked favorably on such statements as satisfying 
the full and fair disclosure requirement.172  The court held that “to 
so attach those statements, it appears to be an appropriate and 
practical way in which to comply with the disclosure 
requirement.”173 
There is case law in Minnesota that holds that full and fair 
disclosure under the antenuptial statute was made without the 
rendering of complete and detailed financial statements.174  In one 
such case, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that since the 
plaintiff and defendant had been acquainted with each other for 
twenty years prior to their marriage, had visited one another’s 
homes, and Plaintiff had visited Defendant’s farms the court held 
that “Plaintiff was familiar with and had full knowledge of the 
extent and nature of Defendant’s property when the antenuptial 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn. 1989). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. 
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agreement was made.”175  Further, in a 1984 Minnesota Court of 
Appeals case, the court found sufficient disclosure when the party 
requesting the antenuptial agreement stated to his future wife that 
he was worth approximately $300,000 to $400,000, when in fact he 
was worth $750,000.176  The court commented that “[t]his 
understatement gave the wife a grossly deflated view of her 
husband’s estate.  However, the record as a whole does support that 
the trial court’s finding that the discrepancy was a good faith error 
resulting from explosive growth in the real estate market.”177 
In an early case, the court found that a confidential 
relationship voided the antenuptial contract because the defendant 
never allowed his future spouse to become acquainted with the full 
value of his property and that “[i]t was his duty to inform her, as 
well as to advise her of the nature and extent of the interest in his 
estate that she was giving up.”178  This case involved the marriage of 
an older man of substantial means to a significantly younger 
fiancée who was pregnant with their child, and to whom he 
provided no information as to his assets, nor informed her 
regarding her entitlements under the law upon his death.179  A 
similar result occurred in a case involving a sixty-six year old retired 
farmer who married a fifty-eight year old German immigrant with 
marginal skills in the English language.180  The court found that 
because Plaintiff was without business experience and no match for 
her husband with regard to negotiating the terms of antenuptial 
agreements, and since there did not appear to be any particular 
disclosure made as to the husband’s property and assets, the 
antenuptial agreement was invalid and unenforceable.181 
Another case illustrates how courts have treated situations 
where one future spouse springs an antenuptial agreement upon 
the other.182  In this case, the wife was told five days prior to the 
wedding that if she did not sign the antenuptial agreement there 
would be no marriage.183  She therefore signed.184  The court 
 
 175. See Gertner v. Gertner, 246 Minn. 319, 325, 74 N.W.2d 809, 814 (1956). 
 176. See Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 177. Id.  
 178. See Slingerland v. Slingerland, 115 Minn. 270, 275, 132 N.W. 326, 328 
(1911). 
 179. Id. at 272, 132 N.W. at 327. 
 180. See Stanger v. Stanger, 152 Minn. 489, 490-91, 189 N.W. 402, 403 (1922). 
 181. Id. at 491, 189 N.W. at 403. 
 182. See Rudbeck v. Rudbeck, 365 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 183. Id. at 332. 
 184. Id. 
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invalidated the antenuptial agreement because the wife had no 
meaningful opportunity to consult with an attorney and because 
the husband failed to make full disclosure.185  The husband’s 
argument that he did make full disclosure is that his wife “had the 
opportunity to determine the extent of his assets because of all the 
‘stuff laying all over [his] desk.’”186 
4.  Discovery Practice in Homestead Litigation 
For the practitioners who do find themselves representing a 
client in homestead or other spousal rights litigation, the aggressive 
use of written and deposition discovery may be helpful in obtaining 
a speedy resolution to the case, either through summary judgment 
or settlement.  Interrogatories requesting information about the 
nature, location, amount of the decedent’s assets, dates of transfers 
made by the decedent, and information regarding the expected 
testimony of witnesses are just some of the areas where relevant 
information may arise.187  Also, requests for production of 
documents seeking tax returns, property tax classifications, 
mortgage documents, deeds, lines of credit, or invoices for utility 
services or renovations may assist in establishing incidents of 
ownership in the event that ownership of the dwelling is 
challenged.188  Finally, with respect to written discovery, detailed 
requests for admissions may assist in narrowing the issues for trial 
or for a summary judgment motion.189  Selected depositions of the 
decedent’s personal representatives, trustees, children, other estate 
beneficiaries, or even close friends early in the litigation may help 
facilitate resolution and will help to root out all of the statements 
allegedly made by the decedent to these individuals.190 
5.  Use of Summary Judgment Motions to Expedite Resolution 
Minnesota summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 333. 
 187. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 33. 
 188. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 34. 
 189. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 36. 
 190. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 30. 
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party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”191  The summary 
judgment standard is a familiar one and is looked upon favorably as 
a means to dispose of litigation where it is clear that no material 
fact issues exist and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
law.192  A material fact, for the purposes of summary judgment, is a 
fact which will affect the outcome of the case.193 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the plain 
language of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
sets the same standard as Rule 56 of  the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure, mandates the entry of summary judgment in the 
following instance: 
[A]fter adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 
of proof at trial.  In such a situation, there can be “no 
genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
non-moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 
immaterial.194 
A motion for summary judgment may be appropriate in 
homestead litigation since, other than the case in which conflicting 
statements from the decedent are argued, the facts surrounding 
the issue of whether a dwelling was owned or occupied might not 
be in dispute.  For example, in the two hypotheticals discussed in 
the introduction of this article there will likely be no dispute that 
the wife transferred her house into a revocable trust prior to the 
marriage or that she resided in a nursing home for the last year of 
her life.195  Likewise, there will likely not be a dispute as to whether 
the husband who died in the car accident while his home was being 
remodeled intended to move into the home with his wife once the 
renovations were complete, or that he and his wife were living in 
her home at the time of his death.196  Summary judgment motions 
in both of these hypotheticals may be an appropriate and 
 
 191. MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03; see also MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 115 
(describing the procedure for bringing a motion for summary judgment). 
 192. See Carlisle v. City of Minneapolis, 437 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989). 
 193. Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 556, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1976). 
 194. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
 195. See supra Part I. 
 196. Id. 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss1/6
DUNCAN FORMATTED.DOC 9/6/2002  10:10 PM 
2002] HOMESTEAD LITIGATION 219 
expedient way to resolve contested issues of what constitutes the 
decedent’s homestead, or at a minimum move the case toward 
settlement.197 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXPANDED DEFINITION OF HOMESTEAD IN 
THE PROBATE CODE 
A.  Generally 
Given the potential for litigation in determining what 
constitutes a decedent’s homestead and whether it is owned and 
occupied by the decedent at the time of death, this author suggests 
that a homestead should be determined in much the same way that 
a person’s domicile is determined.  What follows is a discussion on 
how domicile is determined and how this analysis may be used to 
resolve the ambiguity that exists with respect to the descent of 
homestead statute. 
B.  An Analogy to Domicile 
Domicile requires a person’s physical presence at a location 
coupled with an intention to make that location one’s home.198  To 
acquire a new domicile there must be a union of residence with an 
intent to make the place one’s home.199  As the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has stated, “residence without intention, or intention without 
residence, is of no avail.”200  Once domicile is established it is 
presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.201  The court in 
Smith found that a change in domicile was justified because the 
decedent had taken the following actions:  opened a bank account 
in a particular county; changed his address with the post office; told 
acquaintances of his intent to remain in the county; and identified 
himself in court documents as being a resident of that county.202  
Clearly a person’s intention to make a particular location his or her 
 
 197. The author has noted that in these cases the basic facts are not generally 
disputed, but rather the application of these facts to the definition of homestead is 
what is in dispute, which can be resolved by summary judgment. 
 198. See Manthey v. Comm’r of Revenue, 468 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. 1991).  
See Smith v. Smith, 242 Minn. 85, 89, 64 N.W.2d 129, 131 (1954). 
 199. Manthey, 468 N.W.2d at 549; Smith, 242 Minn. at 89, 64 N.W.2d at 131. 
 200. Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 493, 232 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1975). 
 201. See Manthey, 468 N.W.2d at 550. 
 202. Smith, 242 Minn. at 89-90, 64 N.W.2d at 132. 
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domicile is of paramount importance. 
In terms of an absence from a person’s established domicile 
and the effect of an absence, Minnesota courts have held that a 
mere change of residence, although continued for a long time, 
does not change a person’s domicile.203  The court in Davidner v. 
Davidner found that a physician with an established domicile in 
Minnesota did not change his domicile although he moved to Utah 
for a significant period of time to complete his medical residency.204  
This holding comports with the general rule that while a person 
can have only one domicile, he or she may have more than one 
residence.205 
Notions of domicile and homestead naturally have some 
commonalties, including a physical presence at a location and 
varying degrees of intent to make the location one’s domicile or 
homestead.  Further, temporary absence from the domicile or 
homestead for varying lengths of time does not defeat a claim of 
domicile or homestead.  This article proposes that these common 
elements should be even more closely aligned with each other.  
That is, an intention of a decedent to make a dwelling his or her 
homestead should be given greater consideration and weight, as it 
is in determining domicile.  Further, once a physical presence has 
been established at a dwelling, combined with an intent to make 
the dwelling one’s homestead, a presumption should attach that 
this dwelling is the person’s homestead until a contrary intention is 
shown.  Finally, this author suggests that prolonged physical 
absences from a homestead should not give rise to arguments that 
the dwelling is no longer the person’s homestead.  To expand the 
concept of homestead and its definition of a dwelling owned and 
occupied for purposes of the descent statute to the same standards 
on which a person’s domicile is determined will greatly clarify the 
ambiguity that exists and likely eliminate many of the litigious 
issues that arise.  Further, this expanded concept of a homestead 
under the descent statute is appropriate given Minnesota’s long-
standing protection of the surviving spouse and children with 
respect to homestead rights. 
 
 203. See Davidner, 304 Minn. at 493-94, 232 N.W.2d at 7; Berc v. Berc, 407 
N.W.2d 131, 135 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
 204. Davidner, 304 Minn. at 493-494, 232 N.W.2d at 7. 
 205. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Minnesota has long provided a surviving spouse and children 
with life estate and fee rights in the decedent’s homestead.  With 
the increased frequency of second marriages or marriages 
occurring later in life the potential for litigation over what 
constitutes a decedent’s homestead has also increased, often at the 
cost of significant estate assets in attorneys’ fees and expenses.  A 
greater awareness on the part of the estate planning practitioner of 
mechanisms, such as the waiver of homestead rights, will help to 
minimize the incidents of contested proceedings involving the 
homestead and ensure that a decedent’s wishes are fulfilled.  
Expanded concepts of ownership, which would include homesteads 
held in revocable trusts, and occupancy, which should hinge on the 
decedent’s intent to return to the homestead even during 
significant absences, will further clarify the issue and protect the 
rights of the surviving spouse and children in the homestead. 
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